Auvo Kostiainen, *The Finns of Soviet Karelia as a Target of the Great Terror* 7

The Finns of Soviet Karelia, although a small group of people (according to 1933 Census 12100 persons) were an important target of Stalinist terror. Statistically, it was even a seventeen times greater chance of being terrorized for a Finn than for a Russian in Karelia in 1937–38.

Because of the sense of initiative and special skills of a number of the Finns, they obtained a special position in the Soviet Karelian government, in cultural, economic or party circles at a time when "a giant step towards an industrial society" was being made. This is the reason why their removal was of great significance and had negative economic consequences. The Finns were replaced by other ethnic and national groups, especially persons from the largest group, the Russians, from which the new layers of the elite were to a great extent recruited.

In Finland there was wide interest among the public and in the government circles towards Soviet Karelia. The Soviet OGPU officials found many reasons and explanations to prove that the Finns liquidated, jailed or shot, had cooperated with the secret police of Finland. Probably this of argument has been one of the most common in the "border areas" of the Soviet Union as a justification for the arrests and other acts of Stalinist rule.

Our conception of the position of the Finns in the country, as well as of their persecution, will certainly be more exact after more archival and other studies. For the moment we have to note that the Finns of Soviet Karelia made up only one tenth of the Finnish population in the Soviet Union. More information is needed about the Finns in other parts of the country, since very little has been written about them during the terror years, with the exception of a slight number of individuals. Certainly more studies are still needed on the treatment of various small size ethnic minorities living in all the Soviet Republics.

Jim Seroka, *Yugo-nostalgia, Pragmatism and Reality; Prospects for Inter-Republic Cooperation Among Republics of the Former Socialist Yugoslavia* 17

In 1991, the reality of Yugoslavia came to an abrupt end. In quick succession the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia broke off from the federal state and ended a 75-year experiment in statehood. Four years after the declarations of independence, the successor states remain far apart, resentful of one another and convinced that each has been victimized by the other. Since 1991, there have been few serious attempts at reconciliation, and even the erstwhile
alliance of Croatia and Slovenia has deteriorated and disappeared over time. Today, virtually no political party with any mainstream support advocates reconciliation, and all shun any identification with "Yugo-nostalgia" in any of its forms.

Social and economic pressures, in contrast to the political trends would suggest that there would be strong counteracting pressures in favor of renewed cooperation. Significant percentages of the population of the new republics are from mixed marriages and many considered themselves as "Yugoslavs" in earlier censuses and other legal documents. In addition, prior to 1991, the economies of each of the republics relied on the Yugoslav market to provide the economies of scale and purchasing power for economic survival. Now, the economies of each of the republics are shattered and none have been able to compete successfully in the European environment or find an alternative market to the former Yugoslav federation.

Even though many lives have been shattered by the new borders and political systems, few in any of the successor republics dare to call for a return to "normal" relationships. Just as in 1991, there is only silence now from those who hope to prevent the emergence of new barriers and more destruction of lives and property. The silence serves to strengthen the hands of authoritarian rulers and protects each republic from internal criticism. It also serves to isolate each republic from the European Union and the world community.

Margarita M. Balmaceda, *Bridges, Buffers, or Vacuums? The Soviet Successor States and the Russian-Central European Relationship*. 25

The demise of the Soviet-bloc international institutions and the appearance of new international actors in Central-East Europe has created a more fluid geo-political situation in the region, and the potential for new forms of international relationships to emerge. This paper explores one such relationship — the new security triangle involving Russia, Soviet successor states as Ukraine, and Central Europe. In particular, the article analyzes the role of the Western Soviet successor states — first and foremost Ukraine, but also Belarus' and the Baltics — in the development of a new relationship between Russia and its former Warsaw Pact allies in Central Europe. Particular attention is paid to the role of Ukraine in the formation of various Central European security perceptions of their immediate international environment, and Russia in particular.

Stefan Zwoliński, *Model of the Polish Army in Concepts of the Polish Communist Camp in the Years of World War II*. 39

Using the People's Guard and People's Army, as well as the Polish Armed Forces created on the territory USSR since May 1943, and the Polish Army created at home since May 1944, as examples, the author presents the views of Polish communists on the goals, character and role of the army in struggle for independence and the future political shape of the Polish state. It was the case that both the creation of partisan units as well as of the regular forces of the Polish communist camp were inspired by Russian factors. Although the views on shape and character of partisan formations were relatively unanimous, the regular units of the army stirred many controversies and internal frictions. Many communists saw the creation of the army on Russian soil as a major obstacle to the inclusion of Poland in the Soviet Union. The author also presents problems of step-by-step subordination of the Polish Army to the goals of the communist party and its incorporation and its to the political struggle for power.
Lech Kowalski, *The Polish Army in the Transformation Process* . . . . 53

In the years 1989—1990, when the legal process of dismantling of the old state structures of 'real socialism' started, a new problem emerged — what was to be the role of the armed forces? From the beginning of the changes, the army of People's Poland started to prepare the defence of the old political order. A more liberal approach, as proposed by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, would engender socialism with a human face. It was not the opinion of the entire army though, rather that of the top brass nominated by the party nomenclature. The younger military cadres turned out to be spiritually closer to the ideas voiced by "Solidarność" (which was spectacularly reflected in the June elections to the Polish Parliament in closed voting districts of the Academy of the General Staff of the Polish Army).

It is a fact that the new political elites which appeared on the political scene displayed considerable caution as far as the problems of security and defence of the state were concerned and initially did not interfere with the internal affairs of the armed forces, which were supervised by general Jaruzelski, and were operationally subordinated to the military command of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow, still then functioning. Although it was against the will and expectations of the former political dissidents (their political strategy aimed at membership in NATO), they shared power with the former nomenclature. It is one of the many paradoxes of the early transformation processes in Poland.

Agnieszka Gogolewska, *Democratic Model of Civil-Military Relations* . . . . 69

Two basic Models of Civil-Military Relations are discussed in this paper: a subjective model, characteristic to non-democratic regimes, and an objective model, distinctive of parliamentary democracies. Based on British system, it presents the functioning of the three pillars of the system of objective control over the army in Western democracies. These are: executive management of the armed forces, legislative oversight and civil society. The author analyses the working of each of the pillars and their interdependencies, putting a special emphasis on the importance of civil society for the proper functioning of the objective model.

The author puts forward the thesis that reforms of the armed forces regarding the introduction of the civilian oversight over the army in fact represent an attempt of transition from subjective to objective control over the army and the regulation of its legal status in new constitution and in other legal acts are essential to the success of the reforms. The author comments on the slow progress in parliamentary works in the military legislature, she also criticizes the weakness of the Polish civilian leadership of the military, being a result of a want of cohesive, consequently applied reforms programme, of the insufficiencies in the legislative oversight and the lack of proper cooperation between the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Staffs.

Concluding, the author states that the Polish army remains an army of a highly professional officers corps with limited civilian oversight. To change this situation, it is necessary to quickly complete the legislative works, institutionalize the procedures of civilian control, liquidate the remains of autonomous status of the armed forces, particularly in the social sphere, and creating favourable conditions for the development of the civil society. The introduction of the civilian control over the military is a necessary, though not sufficient condition of Polish membership in NATO.
Liberalism did not fare well in 19th century Poland. For only a few brief years in the 1870s and 1880s a group of liberals known as "Warsaw positivists" dominate the intellectual landscape of the Russian partition. Soon, however, the tone of the liberal press turned from aggressive and polemical to defensive and apologetic, as a new generation shifted towards both the socialist left and the nationalist right. There are many reasons why liberalism could not be sustained as a political force in Poland, and most of them may appear obvious. But the liberalism of the 1870s and 1880s did not simply fade away, the victim of abstract socio-historical forces. Although it may have been a seed cast on infertile ground, it briefly showed some promise of taking root, and its opponents had to engage in a protracted struggle in order to remove it from its privileged position in Warsaw intellectual life. By highlighting one key aspect of that struggle — the debate over liberal political economy — I will try to illuminate the process by which the positivists were dethroned. As we will see, there really was no such debate. Liberalism was not refuted by its opponents, but redefined and re-positioned so that it was no longer within the bounds of "accepted" political discussion. This was accomplished by identifying Warsaw liberalism with the most vulgar versions of laissez-faire economics, an equation which was simplistic and unfair, but highly effective. This essay, then, is not only an examination of 19th century Polish liberalism, but also an analysis of the rhetorical tactics used to undermine it.

Contrary to what pessimists anticipated, the return to power of communists in the shape of social democrats or socialists converts in several countries of Central and Eastern Europe does not bode ill for the stability and continuity of these post-communist countries' foreign policy of integration into Europe while upholding a certain distance to Russia. In fact, the region's new governments chaired by socialist converts have often proven more apt at normalizing relations to post-communist neighbours and more goal-oriented in their EU and NATO policy than their cent­re­to­right conservative nationalistic predecessors.

The theoretical argument offered builds on the concept of foreign policy stabilizers invented by the Swedish political scientist Kjell Goldmann. Thus, the empirical section examining the foreign policy of post-communist Poland, Lithuania and Hungary also points to stabilizers of foreign policy working at the following four levels in all three countries, namely international stabilizers, cognitive stabilizers, political stabilizers and administrative stabilizers.

Among other things, the analysis points to the broad consensus surrounding the strategy of re-linking one's country with the Western centre of economic and military power such as the EU and NATO. In effect, this means a strong commitment to so-called Einbindung, international participation and cooperation on the part of the new post-communist elites and their citizenry. Although the article was written a year and a half ago, the author believes the overall reasoning to continue to be valid and applicable to recent developments in the three countries under review and perhaps also to Estonia and Bulgaria.

October 1956 brought a fundamental change to Polish-Russian relations. The author focuses on the historical meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (19—21 October 1956) and, in the second part of his article reveals the content of the talks held in Moscow in November 1956 on the presence of Russian troops on Polish soil. Since the October Plenum the presence of the Russian Army in Poland ceased to be a secret. After calling Marshal Rokosowski and many Russian officers back to Moscow, there was still strong subordination of the Polish Army to the Soviet Centrum but with certain influences exercised by the communist authorities in Warsaw. Gomułka accepted the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, strongly believing in Russian support against the German threat. The other major change was in the structure of political terror. Total terror was replaced with selective terror, operated by the Polish Security Services at this time. The communist party stayed in power but Russian rule was modified. The satellite states were kept under control with more space to take decisions without the necessity of asking for Moscow’s clearance for each step. It opened hopes for Polish independence and encouraged some circles to intellectual struggle with the system.